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Cyber Risk: How the 2011 Sony Data Breach and the 
Need for Cyber Risk Insurance Policies Should Direct 
the Federal Response to Rising Data Breaches 
Lance Bonner  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, a number of high profile data breaches made national 
news.
1
 Companies such as Epsilon Data Management and Nasdaq 
experienced data breaches that posed serious risks to their business 
operations.
2
 Total data loss incidents numbered in the hundreds, and 
multiple incidents involved millions of records.
3
 
Large amounts of information have been involved in some of the 
most recent data breaches. Epsilon, the target of a data breach in 
April 2011, sends forty billion marketing emails on behalf of its 
business clients each year, and its clients include two of the largest 
banks in the United States.
4
 As a result of the breach, more than forty 
of Epsilon‘s clients, including TD Ameritrade, Eddie Bauer, and 
 
  J.D. Candidate (2013), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2010), University 
of Pittsburgh. I thank my fiancée, Sam Miller, for her unwavering love and support throughout 
all of law school. I would also like to thank my family, especially my sister, Blair, and my 
mother, Gail, for giving me inspiration to push forward. Lastly, I want to thank Tom 
Mielenhausen for helping me develop the idea for this Note. I dedicate this Note to the fond 
memory of my late father, T.S. Bonner. 
 1. See, e.g., Matthew J. Schwartz, Six Worst Data Breaches of 2011, INFORMATION 
WEEK (Dec. 28, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/ 
232301079. According to at least one source, four of the top ten largest data breaches ever 
recorded occurred in 2011. Largest Data Loss Incidents, DATALOSSDB, http://datalossdb.org/in 
dex/largest (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (citing the breaches of Sony Corporation, Tianya, SK 
Communications, and Valve, Inc.). 
 2. Schwartz, supra note 1. 
 3. See DATALOSSDB, http://datalossdb.org/. 
 4. Lisa Greim, Breached E-Mail Marketer Sends Billions of E-Mails A Year, PCWORLD 
(Apr. 5, 2011, 4:45 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/224373/breached_email_marketer_ 
sends_billions_of_emails_a_year.html. 
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Ethan Allen, contacted their customers to inform them their personal 
information might be at risk.
5
 
Of all the data breaches in 2011, the string of data breaches that 
plagued Sony Corporation were arguably the most high profile.
6
 Sony 
made headlines for breaches of its Playstation Network and Qiocity 
services in April as hackers accessed Sony‘s clients‘ personal 
information.
7
 
As news spread of the mounting data breaches hitting Sony, an 
ancillary issue involving Sony‘s insurance coverage surfaced.8 Zurich 
American Insurance Company, one of Sony‘s insurers, filed suit in 
New York state court asking the court for a release from any duty to 
defend or indemnify Sony as to claims surrounding the data 
breaches.
9
 The suit brought to light the growing realization among 
businesses that traditional commercial liability policies will not cover 
damages and other costs incurred as a result of a data breach.
10
 To fill 
the void of coverage under traditional commercial liability policies, 
insurance companies are now offering alternative specialty products, 
often referred to as ―cyber risk‖ policies.11 
The Sony data breaches and other data privacy issues have 
inspired a renewed and forceful discussion among privacy 
advocates,
12
 practitioners,
13
 and politicians
14
 on what role government 
 
 5. Id. Epsilon‘s customers include TiVo, Capital One, US Bank, JPMorgan Chase, Citi, 
Home Shopping Network, Ameriprise Financial, McKinsey & Company, Ritz-Carlton 
Rewards, Marriott Rewards, Walgreens, Best Buy, and Robert Half Technologies. Jared 
Newman, Epsilon E-Mail Hack: What You Need to Know, PCWORLD (Apr. 4, 2011, 1:35 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/224213/epsilon_email_hack_what_you_need_to_know.html. 
 6. One source counts as many as twenty-one digital attacks against Sony in 2011. A 
Concise History of Sony Attacks, ATTRITION.ORG (June 4, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://attrition.org/ 
security/rant/sony_aka_sownage.html. 
 7. Bryan Petrilla, ―Anonymous‖ Hacks Sony PlayStation Network: The Increasing 
Importance of Obtaining Cybersecurity Insurance Coverage, MONDAQ BLOG (May 12, 2011), 
available at 2011 WLNR 9433823. 
 8. Jaikumar Vijayan, Zurich Lawsuit Against Sony Highlights Cyber Insurance 
Shortcomings, COMPUTERWORLD (July 26, 2011 6:00 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/ 
article/9218639/Zurich_lawsuit_against_Sony_highlights_cyber_insurance_shortcomings. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Scott Godes, Cybersecurity Risks and Insurance Coverage, in 3–18 NEW APPLEMAN 
LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 18.03 (Matthew Bender 2011). 
 12. See, e.g., Data Breaches: A Year in Review, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 
16, 2011), https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach-year-review-2011. 
 13. Stephen J. Rancourt, Articles, Hacking, Theft, and Corporate Negligence: Making the 
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should play in regulating how companies and organizations protect 
data. At least some observers believe insurance should play some role 
in this discussion.
15
 Part II of this Note will review the Sony data 
breach to highlight the growing risks to businesses and organizations 
in storing electronic data, and the current and proposed governmental 
response. Part III will discuss why the inadequacy of traditional 
general commercial liability insurance policies in covering claims 
related to data storage has made new cyber risk insurance policies 
necessary for entities subject to cyber risk. Lastly, Part IV will call 
for governmental action in facilitating the expansion of cyber risk 
policies through incentives and infrastructure building to solve the 
coverage gap plaguing U.S. businesses and organizations. 
II. DATA BREACHES 
A. A Cyber Catastrophe 
In late April of 2011, Sony, Inc. shut down its online PlayStation 
Network (PSN) in response to a data security breach.
16
 Over seventy-
seven million users use the network in countries across the globe, and 
it is an integral part of Sony‘s video game system.17 For almost a 
week, Sony failed to inform PSN users as to the reason for the 
network shutdown.
18
 A message was subsequently posted on Sony‘s 
 
Case for Mandatory Encryption of Personal Information, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 183, 186 
(2011) (calling for federal regulation to ―incentivize the proper storage and transmission of 
personal data‖). 
 14. See, e.g., Juliana Gruenwald, Lawmakers Say Sony Data Breach Underscores Need for 
Legislation, NAT‘L J. (Apr. 27, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2011/ 
04/lawmakers-say-sony-data-breach.php. 
 15. See, e.g., Rancourt, supra note 13, at 214–15. 
 16. PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 12. The network includes an online 
store that users can access through their PlayStation® 3 consoles allowing them to purchase 
games, movies, and various entertainment products. PlayStation® Network, PLAYSTATION, 
http://us.playstation.com/psn/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
 17. Petrilla, supra note 7. One of the network‘s games, ―Call of Duty: Black Ops,‖ quickly 
made over $1 billion. Id. The game features online multiplayer capability that pits player 
against player in real time, commanding soldiers outfitted with various guns. Call of Duty: 
Black Ops, CALL OF DUTY, http://www.callofduty.com/blackops/game (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012). 
 18. Nick Bilton, Sony Defends Security Actions, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at B4, 
available at 2011 WLNR 10233618. 
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website stating that the company suspected unidentified individuals 
had stolen PSN users‘ personal information.19 Stolen data included 
names, home addresses, e-mail addresses, birth dates, network 
passwords and login information.
20
 A later e-mail sent to all PSN 
users revealed that Sony suspected credit card information had also 
been obtained.
21
 Sony kept the PSN down for almost a month until 
the network resumed on May 14, 2011.
22
 
Sony was highly criticized for waiting a week to inform customers 
of the reason for the network shutdown.
23
 Some observers took the 
opportunity to draw unfavorable comparisons to some of Sony‘s 
biggest competitors such as Apple and Microsoft.
24
 After another 
attack in June, one security expert even referred to Sony as the 
―whipping boy of the computer underground.‖25 The data breach also 
prompted members of Congress to call for private and public reforms 
in standards for protecting online personal information.
26
 With 
 
 19. Petrilla, supra note 7. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Seth Schiesel, PlayStation Security Breach a Test of Consumers‘ Trust, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 2011, at C3, available at 2011 WLNR 8221249. 
 22. Bilton, supra note 18, at B4. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Schiesel, supra note 21, at C3. As the author observes: 
Can anyone imagine Microsoft allowing hackers to ravish its network or Apple 
allowing crooks to steal tens of millions of customers‘ intimate information on iTunes 
and then having to hire an outside company to figure out what happened? 
Id. 
 25. Sony Slammed over New Data Breach, CBC NEWS (June 3, 2011), http://www.cbc.ca/ 
news/world/story/2011/06/03/sony-2nd-data-breach.html. 
 26. See, e.g., Blumenthal Calls for DOJ Investigation of Sony PlayStation Data Breach, 
FEDERAL INFORMATION & NEWS DISPATCH (Apr. 28, 2011), available at 2011 WLNR 
8346908. In a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder, Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat 
from Connecticut, criticized Sony and the handling of the breach: 
I am especially concerned about Sony‘s failure to promptly notify its customers about 
the breach and what data may have been compromised. . . .  
 . . . .This week-long delay in disclosing a possible breach of financial information is 
unacceptable, and left consumers highly vulnerable . . . . Any investigation of this 
matter should include a thorough inquiry into whether Sony‘s handling of events in the 
wake of its security breach gives rise to civil or criminal liability. If it does not, I 
would welcome comments from the Justice Department regarding how the law can be 
updated to best hold companies accountable for inadequate protection of personal 
consumer information, and inadequate notification when breaches occur. 
Id. 
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mounting criticism over the lack of data security and poor financial 
performance, Sony cut its Chairman‘s salary and bonus by 15 
percent.
27
 
According to one observer, Sony‘s exposure as a result of the 
breach could reach into the tens of billions of dollars.
28
 Costs include 
an identity theft protection policy for PSN users and an ongoing 
electronic forensics exam and investigation.
29
 Sony also faces 
mounting liability from class action lawsuits accusing Sony of 
negligence and breach of privacy.
30
 
With such extremely high costs, Sony is understandably seeking 
coverage from its insurers.
31
 With at least one insurer, Sony has faced 
substantial challenges in seeking coverage for many of its losses.
32
 
Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich) petitioned a New 
York state court to find that Zurich does not have a duty to defend 
Sony in the increasing number of lawsuits filed against Sony in the 
wake of the breach.
33
 Zurich also joined other Sony insurers in the 
suit so that the court can clarify their respective responsibilities.
34
 The 
lawsuit claims Sony has a commercial general liability (CGL) policy 
with Zurich that does not cover cyber-related third-party claims.
35
 
The challenges Sony faces in seeking coverage for cyber-related 
losses are a telling sign of the new landscape of cyber-related liability 
as it relates to insurance coverage.
36
 Sony will most likely have a 
difficult time getting coverage under its CGL policy for most 
 
 27. Sony Cuts Howard Stringer‘s Pay Package as Chairman by 15%, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 2011, at B8, available at 2011 WLNR 12898643. 
 28. Petrilla, supra note 7. 
 29. Lori Chordas, Sony to Offer $1M Insurance Policies to US Gamers Impacted by 
Massive Cyber Breach, BESTWIRE SERVICES (May 11, 2011), available at http://fpn.advisen 
.com/articles/article144465919972383322.html. 
 30. Petrilla, supra note 7. As of July 21, 2011, a reported fifty-five class-action suits had 
been filed against Sony in the United States. Sony Insurer Sues to Deny Data Breach Coverage, 
21 NO. 42 WESTLAW J. INS. COVERAGE 1, July 29, 2011, available at 2011 WL 3236597. 
 31. Patricia Vowinkel, A Carrier Draws a Line in the Sand: Zurich Tries to Delineate 
Where CGL Policies End and Network Security Risk Policies Begin, RISK & INS. (Aug. 1, 
2011), http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=533340443&topic=Main. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Zurich Asks Court to Vacate Sony Claims, RISK & INS. (Sept. 1, 2011), 
http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=533340682. 
 34. Id. Sony‘s insurers also include Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance, AIG, and ACE Ltd. Id. 
 35. Vowinkel, supra note 31. 
 36. See, e.g., id. 
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expenses associated with the data breach.
37
 Companies seeking to 
protect against cyber risks must now seek cyber risk-related 
insurance policies, which have become increasingly available over 
the past decade.
38
 
B. The Rising Storm 
Although unprecedented in the amount of information stolen and 
the prominence of the company, Sony is not the first to experience a 
major security breach. Around 2000, academic commentators and 
practicing risk professionals began to recognize the significant 
liability risks that the movement towards electronic data storage and 
Internet business posed to companies and organizations.
39
 Over a 
decade ago, businesses were confronting ―information theft, insertion 
of malicious codes, denial of service attacks, access violations, failure 
of computer security, programming errors, and misuse or 
misappropriation of intangible assets.‖40 In the late 1990s, some 
estimates put business costs related to computer security breaches in 
the hundreds of billions of dollars.
41
 
In 2000, the Love Bug virus circulated, causing estimated 
damages upwards of $15 billion to business, individuals, and 
governments across the globe.
42
 Damages as a result of electronic 
security breaches have not slowed since. Over the past few years, 
cyber criminals have infiltrated data networks at major companies 
including TJ Maxx/Marshalls, Barnes & Noble, Bank of America and 
 
 37. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 38. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 39. See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Physical Losses in Cyberspace, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 55 
(2002). 
 40. Id. at 58–59 (citations omitted). 
 41. Id. at 58 n.12. 
 42. Id. at 60. See also Charles Piller & Greg Miller, Fast-Moving Virus Hits Computers 
Worldwide, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2000, available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/2000/may/ 
05/news/mn-26739. The Love Bug spread through e-mails and destroyed files once opened on 
computers. Id. The virus would then replace destroyed files with new files that would further 
spread the virus when the new file was opened. Id. Companies affected included AT&T Corp., 
Microsoft Corp., Time Warner Inc., Southern California Edison Co., Merrill Lynch & Co., and 
Ford Motor Co. Id. The Pentagon, CIA, NASA, and British House of Commons were also hit. 
Id. 
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Wells Fargo.
43
 At least one of these data breaches went undiscovered 
for almost two years, and some most likely have never been 
discovered.
44
 In 2008, the Department of Justice recorded a 47 
percent increase in reported data breaches from the previous year.
45
 
Despite large numbers of data breaches over the past decade, 2011 
saw a number of high-profile incidents make headlines and ignite 
public discussion. Citigroup,
46
 Heartland Payment Systems,
47
 RSA 
Security Division of the EMC Corporation, and Lockheed Martin
48
 
are just a few of the companies that made headlines for major data 
security breaches. Some of these breaches involved interrelated cyber 
criminal activity and greatly impacted existing business 
relationships.
49
 
Companies face an array of costs as a result of a data breach.
50
 
Along with any costs associated with fixing security insufficiencies 
that led to the data breach, companies must often expend money 
contacting customers, offering and paying for the services of credit 
reporting agencies, any costs in assisting law enforcement, business 
disruption expenditures, and litigation expenses.
51
 The aftermath of 
the Sony data breach is a threatening example of the damage to 
institutional goodwill that is possible as a result of a data breach.
52
  
 
 43. John Winn & Kevin Govern, Identity Theft: Risks and Challenges to Business of Data 
Compromise, 28 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 49, 50 (2009). 
 44. Id. at 51. 
 45. Id. at 50. 
 46. See Eric Dash et al., Citi Data Theft Points Up a Nagging Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 
10, 2011, at B1, available at 2011 WLNR 11587410. Hackers reportedly stole personal 
information from over 200,000 credit card holders. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Christopher Drew, Stolen Data is Tracked to Hacking at Lockheed, N.Y. TIMES, June 
4, 2011, at B1, available at 2011 WLNR 11167661. 
 49. Id. Lockheed determined that the breach of its network was made possible through the 
use of data stolen from the RSA Security Division of the EMC Corporation. Id. 
 50. Winn & Govern, supra note 43, at 52. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See supra Part II.A. 
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C. A Crime for the New Millennium 
A ―data breach‖ is the unauthorized or unintentional exposure, 
disclosure, or loss of sensitive personal information.
53
 As was the 
case with the security breach of Sony‘s PSN, data breaches may be 
achieved through ―hacking.‖54 The most traditional form of hacking 
involves electronically stealing commercially valuable data that can 
be sold or used for profit.
55
 Hacking is broadly defined as ―attempts 
to intentionally access or harm information assets without (or in 
excess of) authorization by thwarting logical security mechanisms.‖56 
Traditionally, hacking was only for determined individuals with 
extensive computer programming abilities.
57
 Now, hacking can be 
achieved through the use of reasonably accessible programming 
tools.
58
 A recent trend in hacking is the use of ―botnets.‖59 Botnets 
 
 53. Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, Data Breach: What the Underground World of ―Carding‖ 
Reveals, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 375, 377 (2009). 
 54. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 55. See Douglas Wood, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, Class of 2011: 
Recreational Hacking, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/Pub 
ArticleCC.jsp?id=1202510773996. 
 56. 2011 Data Breach Investigation Report, VERIZON, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/ 
resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf. 
 57. See Rizgar Mohammed Kadir, The Scope and the Nature of Computer Crimes 
Statutes—A Critical Comparative Study, 11 GERMAN L.J. 609, 618 (2010) (‖In the earlier days 
of the computer and prior to the internet, insider computer crimes predominated and 
perpetrators were generally computer specialists: programmers, computer operators, data entry 
personnel, systems analysts, and computer managers. The advent of the Internet, however, soon 
made it possible to commit such crimes from outside a victimized computer.‖) (citation 
omitted). 
 58. See, e.g., Kelly Jackson Higgins, New Firefox Plug-In offers WiFi Cookie-Jacking For 
‗Average Joe‘, SECURITY DARK READING (Oct. 25, 2010, 4:40 PM), http://www.darkreading 
.com/security/news/227900742/new-firefox-plug-in-offers-wifi-cookie-jacking-for-average-joe 
.html. Firefox, an Internet browser, has a plug-in that makes ―it possible for the average Joe to 
hijack a WiFi user‘s Facebook, Twitter, or other unsecured account session‖ without much 
difficulty. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Another Pleads Guilty in BotNet 
Hacking Conspiracy, June 10, 2010, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ 
press-releases/2010.html. See also Riva Richmond, U.S. Dismantles Large Network Of PCs 
Infected by Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2011, at B2, available at 2011 WLNR 7356153; 
Byron Acohido, An Invitation to Crime: How a Friendly Click Can Compromise a Company, 
U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 4, 2010, at 1A, available at 2010 WLNR 4482026. Botnets involve 
infecting a computer, which ―gets slotted into a network of thousands of other bots. These 
‗botnets‘ then are directed to execute all forms of cybercrime, from petty scams to 
cyberespionage.‖ Id. 
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have been used to hack into and control computers as well as extract 
data from user databases.
60
 Large and small companies have been 
vulnerable to botnets, and at least one botnet was created to target 
international businesses for the purpose of stealing business secrets.
61
 
―Recreational hacking‖ is another example of the evolving 
landscape of cyber risk and data breaches.
62
 Recreational hacking 
involves ―hacking for the simple purpose of shutting down corporate 
sites not for pecuniary gain, but because of ideological or otherwise 
selfish views . . .‖63 Recreational hackers have started forming 
associations that hack under a common name, many of which have 
been responsible for the data breaches over the past few years.
64
 
These online organizations include groups like Anonymous and 
LulzSec.
65
 
Originally formed in opposition to the Church of Scientology, 
Anonymous has recently taken up international political causes and 
defended WikiLeaks with attacks on MasterCard and PayPal.
66
 
LulzSec, the group purportedly responsible for the Sony attack, has 
operated under motivations that are not as clearly defined.
67
 
 
 60. Fernando M. Pinguelo & Bradford W. Muller, Virtual Crimes, Real Damages: A 
Primer On Cybercrimes in the United States and Efforts to Combat Cybercriminals, 16 VA. J.L. 
& TECH 116, 132–33 (2011). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Wood, supra note 55. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Riva Richmond & Nick Bilton, Saying It‘s Disbanding, Hacker Group Urges New 
Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at B1, available at 2011 WLNR 12745202. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. Although LulzSec has disbanded, security experts believe attacks are unlikely to 
decrease against websites. In declaring its dissolution, LulzSec encouraged other hackers to 
continue attacks on governments and corporations. Id. See also Jerry Brito, ‗We Do It For The 
Lulz‘: What Makes LulzSec Tick?, TIME: TECHLAND, June 17, 2011, available at http://tech 
land.time.com/2011/06/17/we-do-it-for-the-lulz-what-makes-lulzsec-tick/ (stating that LulzSec 
does not seem to be motivated by money and members do not appear to be state-sponsored 
spies). LulzSec‘s motivations could be described as anarchistic, existentialist, or nihilistic. Id. 
The group‘s press releases, Twitter account, and website have often featured less than serious 
messages. Id. However, they also appear to have occasionally operated under some political 
motivations. See Adam Martin, Highlights of What‘s Been Found In LulzSec‘s Arizona 
Documents, ATLANTIC WIRE, June 24, 2011, available at http://www.theatlanticwire.com/ 
national/2011/06/highlights-whats-been-found-lulzsecs-arizona-documents/39244/ (describing 
LulzSec‘s attack on Arizona law enforcement in retaliation for Arizona immigration policies). 
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Most data breaches are a result of external actors such as 
hackers.
68
 However, hacking is not the only source of data breaches.
69
 
Other sources include malware,
70
 social attacks,
71
 misuse,
72
 physical 
action,
73
 and error.
74
 Cyber espionage is also posing a looming threat 
to businesses.
75
 
Cyber criminals are often after data that includes contact 
information, birth dates, medical data, social security numbers, 
passport numbers, bank information, and credit card information.
76
 
Loss of information can result in various negative effects for 
consumers, including identity theft,
77
 loss to credit and reputation, 
emotional distress, out-of-pocket expenses, and lost opportunities.
78
 
D. Current Cyber-Security Related Legislation 
Consumers subject to personal data exposure have had a hard time 
seeking remedies in U.S. courts against businesses that have been the 
 
 68. VERIZON, supra note 56, at 26, 31. 
 69. Id. at 24–42. 
 70. Id. at 27. Malware can be ―any software or code developed or used for the purpose of 
compromising or harming information assets . . .‖ Id. According to the 2011 Verizon study, 
almost half of data breaches in 2010 were caused by malware, resulting in almost 80 percent of 
data lost. Id. 
 71. Id. at 36. The Verizon report characterized social tactics as ―deception, manipulation, 
intimidation, etc. [employed] to exploit the human element, or users, of information assets.‖ Id. 
These tactics include solicitation and bribery, pretexting, counterfeiting/forgery, and phishing. 
Id. 
 72. Id. at 38 (defining ―misuse‖ as ―using entrusted organizational resources or privileges 
for any purpose or in a manner contrary to that which was intended‖). Misuse includes 
embezzlement, skimming, and other fraud. Id. It can also entail abuse of system access as well 
as use of unapproved hardware and devices. Id. 
 73. Id. at 40 (defining physical action to include ―human-driven threats that employ 
physical actions and/or require physical proximity‖). Specific actions include tampering, 
surveillance, and theft. Id. 
 74. Id. at 42. According to the Verizon report, this was the smallest source of data loss. 
Error includes ―omissions, misconfigurations, programming errors, trips and spills, 
malfunctions, etc.‖ Id. 
 75. Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 60, at 123–25. 
 76. Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identify Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 
S.C. L. REV. 255, 256 (2005). 
 77. Identity theft has been on the rise since the late 1980s, and some estimates put the 
resulting costs to businesses in the billions of dollars per year. Winn & Govern, supra note 43, 
at 49. Costs to consumers have been reported to be as high as two billion dollars per year and 
millions of hours are spent on cleaning up the resulting mess. Id. 
 78. Johnson, supra note 76, at 256–57. 
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target of cyber attacks.
79
 For example, in Pisciotta v. Old National 
Bancorp, plaintiffs sought compensation after their personal 
information was taken from the defendant‘s website.80 The Pisciotta 
plaintiffs sought costs incurred for credit-monitoring services as well 
as emotional distress based on a negligence theory.
81
 The court held 
that ―[w]ithout more than allegations of increased risk of future 
identity theft, the plaintiffs have not suffered a harm that the law is 
prepared to remedy.‖82 The plaintiffs had relied on a state data 
security breach notification law to assert that the legislature intended 
for individuals to have a legally recognizable and compensable injury 
when personal information is exposed.
83
 The court refused to 
recognize this inference and noted that other jurisdictions confronting 
a similar issue had failed to accept such an argument.
84
 
As of February 2012, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have enacted customer data 
breach notification laws similar to the law plaintiffs attempted to rely 
upon in Pisciotta.
85
 However, as demonstrated in Pisciotta, 
consumers generally do not have a cause of action for the exposure of 
their personal information resulting from a data breach.
86
 Federal 
laws also provide very few, if any, meaningful remedies and private 
 
 79. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat‘l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007); Forbes v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 2006) (denying recovering for credit 
monitoring costs); Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779-81 (W.D. 
Mich. 2006) (denying claim as failure to show personal information has been used barred 
recovery). 
 80. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 631–32. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 639. 
 83. Id. at 636–37. 
 84. Id. at 637, 639. 
 85. State Security Breach Notification Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecommunications-information-technolo 
gy/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last updated Aug. 20, 2012). Security breach 
notification laws require customers to be notified of security breaches that compromise personal 
information. Id. 
 86. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Warranting Data Security, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 
L. 63, 68–72 (2010) (observing that ―there are two major impediments to recovery for the losses 
that individuals incur as a result of a data breach. The first . . . . is that the damages are seen as 
too speculative. Second, purely economic losses that are not coupled with personal injury or 
physical property damage are not recoverable in tort.‖). 
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rights of action against companies that fail to secure personal 
information.
87
 
As a result of the void in private remedies for individual 
consumers victimized by data breaches, federal legislation has been 
proposed and several states have enacted legislation requiring data 
encryption.
88
 However, proposals for widespread change have stayed 
just that: proposals.
89
 
The Data Accountability and Trust Act, introduced in 2009, would 
have charged the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with setting 
regulations on storing and the disposal of personal information.
90
 
Businesses and organizations that violated these promulgated rules 
would be subject to fairly steep fines.
91
 The bill also called for 
consumers to be notified when their personal information was 
compromised.
92
 
The Data Security and Breach Notification Act is one of the more 
recent proposed bills concerning data breaches.
93
 Like its 
predecessor, the bill calls for FTC directed regulations, penalties, and 
standards for data encryption.
94
 Although the proposed bills do not 
call for mandatory insurance to cover data breaches, at least one 
observer has noted the possibility of including such a provision in a 
new federal law.
95
 
President Obama and White House Cybersecurity Coordinator 
Howard Schmidt recently called for national cybersecurity 
legislation.
96
 President Obama mentioned cybersecurity legislation in 
 
 87. See Rancourt, supra note 13, at 201–05 (asserting that ―[s]tatutory, not just economic, 
damages should be available to the persons affected by . . . . data breaches because the current 
federal statutory landscape is unable to provide adequate redress‖). 
 88. Id. at 205–12. See also NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.215 (2010) (requiring data collectors 
to encrypt personal information); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00 (2008) (establishing 
requirements for security involving data breaches and requiring data encryption). For proposed 
federal legislation see Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009); see 
also Data Security and Breach Notification Act, S. 3742, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 89. Rancourt, supra note 13, at 212. 
 90. See H.R. 2221 § 2(a). 
 91. H.R. 2221 § 4(c)(2)(A)(i). 
 92. See H.R. 2221 § 3(a)(1). 
 93. Rancourt, supra note 13, at 212. 
 94. S. 3742 § 2(a). 
 95. Rancourt, supra note 13, at 215. 
 96. Elizabeth Montalbano, White House Presses For New Cybersecurity Laws, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 27, 2012, 2:02 PM), available at http://www.informationweek.com/ 
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his 2012 State of the Union address and stressed cooperation between 
the private and public sectors.
97
 The new law would also include a 
national data breach notification requirement, instead of the 
patchwork system currently implemented at the state level.
98
 
However, this proposal has met with some opposition, specifically 
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, amid worries that increasing 
regulatory and financial burdens could be problematic for critical 
infrastructure companies.
99
 Other critics assert that the president‘s 
proposal places too heavy an emphasis on regulatory action and not 
enough consideration of private sector capabilities.
100
 It is in this 
climate that insurance for cyber risk liabilities enters the discussion. 
III. DATA BREACH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
A. Outdated Insurance for a Modern Problem 
A ―cyber‖ risk is comprised of the previously mentioned cyber 
crimes and more generally encompasses risks that are associated with 
Internet business activity.
101
 As with any other risk, businesses and 
organizations seek to protect themselves against cyber-related losses 
through insurance policies tailored towards the specific risks that are 
responsible for these losses.
102
 The majority of businesses purchase 
commercial general liability (CGL) insurance to cover a wide array 
of risks and are typically the first place businesses seek coverage 
related to possible future losses.
103
 
 
news/government/security/232500639. Schmidt stated his desire ―that members of Congress 
will look at the significant amount of public debate that has been occurring on these issues—as 
well as the work and debate on this issue over the years in the Congress—and continue to work 
in a bipartisan manner to quickly enact legislation to address the full range of cyber threats 
facing our nation.‖ Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Erich Schwartzel, Cybersecurity Insurance: Many Companies Continue To Ignore 
the Issue, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (June 22, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette 
.com/pg/10173/1067262-96.stm. 
 101. Jayson W. Sowers, Insurance Coverage for Cyberspace Liabilities, 723 PRACTISING 
L. INST./LITIG. 199, 205 (2005). 
 102. Winn & Govern, supra note 43, at 53. Businesses traditionally seek insurance 
coverage to protect against potential liabilities such as fire, flood, and theft. Id. 
 103. Sowers, supra note 101, at 208. 
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Modern standard CGL policies can be traced to the 1940s.
104
 CGL 
policies may differ based on the insured and the insurer, but most 
CGL policies are based on standard policies drafted by the Insurance 
Services Office (ISO), Inc.
105
 Companies acquire CGL policies to 
mitigate liability for damages caused to third parties as a result of 
company negligence.
106
 However, damages covered under a CGL 
policy are not unlimited. In 1965, the ISO modified its standard CGL 
policy to make it explicit that the only losses covered under its 
standard policy were losses for physical damage or loss of 
property.
107
 The standard CGL policy was never designed to cover 
lost profits, loss of goodwill, or any intangible losses.
108
 This 
coverage gap in CGL policies to cover intangible assets has been 
most problematic for companies seeking to recover for losses 
incurred as a result of data breaches.
109
 
CGL policies today contain two coverage parts that might be 
relevant to cyber-related losses.
110
 First, CGL policies cover damages 
as a result of ―bodily injury‖ or ―property damage.‖111 ―Bodily 
injury‖ will most likely not be relevant in cyber-related coverage 
issues, thus coverage under this first part is determined by the 
definition of ―property damage.‖112 
Property damage is most commonly defined as the ―physical 
injury to‖ or ―loss of use of tangible property.‖113 Whether electronic 
data is considered ―tangible property‖ has been a major issue in 
 
 104. Paula M. Yost, Paul E.B. Glad & William T. Barker, In Search of Coverage in 
Cyberspace: Why the Commercial General Liability Policy Fails to Insure Lost or Corrupted 
Computer Data, 54 SMU L. REV. 2055, 2062 (2001). 
 105. Id. Insurance Services Office, Inc. provides detailed information about risk, claims, 
and pricing based on language in its promulgated policies. Id. at 2063. 
 106. Id. at 2064. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 2064–65. 
 109. See id. at 2075 (―[T]angibility is the touchstone of ‗property damage‘ coverage under 
a CGL. Because words are to be given their ordinary meaning, and because information and 
ideas cannot be ‗touched or felt,‘ information and ideas—however, memorialized—are not 
‗tangible property‘ and no coverage will flow from their loss or corruption . . . . The [CGL] 
contract simply provides for nothing more.‖). 
 110. Sowers et al., supra note 101, at 208–09. CGL policies are typically divided into two 
parts: Coverage A and Coverage B. Id. 
 111. Id. at 209. The first coverage part is Coverage A. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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determining whether loss of or damage to data is covered under CGL 
policies.
114
 To avoid this ambiguity, recent CGL policies explicitly 
exclude electronic data from the definition of tangible property.
115
 
In addition to coverage provisions for property damage, CGL 
policies also contain provisions covering losses for personal and 
advertising injury claims.
116
 A number of revisions of the personal 
and advertising injury clauses have been promulgated since the 
language was first inserted in standard form CGL policies in 1986.
117
 
Due to the revisions, a number of iterations of the personal and 
advertising injury language can be found in CGL policies.
118
 
However, under the common language of advertising injury clauses, 
coverage for cyber risk claims will be difficult if not impossible.
119
 
B. New Cyber Risk Insurance Policies 
Considering the possible coverage gaps that exist under traditional 
CGL policies, insurers and companies with potential cyber risk 
 
 114. Compare Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc., No. 99-185, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 7299, at *6 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2000) (holding that there was physical damage when 
information stored on random access memory was destroyed), with Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul 
Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 96 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that damage to software did not 
constitute physical damage to tangible property). 
 115. Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 12 04), ISO (2003), 
available at www.ramsgate.com/forms/CG0001.pdf (―For the purposes of this insurance, 
electronic data is not tangible property. As used in this definition, electronic data means 
information, facts or programs stored as or on, created or used on, or transmitted to or from 
computer software, including systems and applications software, hard or floppy disks, CD-
ROMS, tapes, drives, cells, data processing devices or any other media which are used with 
electronically controlled equipment.‖). See also Sowers, supra note 101, at 209. 
 116. See Sowers, supra note 101, at 210. 
 117. Id. at 210–11. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 212–20. Although the original advertising injury coverage grant was fairly 
broad, it has been limited by requirements insurers have put into CGL policy language. Id. at 
212–13. An insured must meet four requirements: (1) the insured must have engaged in 
―advertising activities;‖ (2) the underlying claim must be among enumerated ―offenses;‖ 
(3) there is a causal link between the alleged injury and activity; and (4) no exclusion bars 
coverage. Id. at 213. Among the issues businesses face in finding coverage under this provision 
include falling under ―advertising activities,‖ the meaning of ―offense,‖ and the scope of the 
requisite enumerated offenses. Id. at 213–19. 
 Few cases have interpreted the personal injury definition as related to cyber claims. Id. at 
220. Under the personal injury definition, the only offenses that might be applicable to cyber-
liability coverage issues are wrongful entry or eviction and violation of the right of privacy. Id. 
at 220–21. 
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liability have sought new insurance products to cover these new 
risks.
120
 Many of the largest insurers now provide cyber risk policies 
to fill these gaps.
121
 Policies include coverage for data compromise, 
network risk, computer data coverage, and other various cyber 
liabilities.
122
 
ISO promulgates a standard policy form entitled ―Internet 
Liability and Network Protection Policy,‖ which insurers may use as 
a template for cyber risk coverage.
123
 ISO‘s ―menu-based policy‖ 
includes five possible coverage agreements: (1) website publishing 
liability;
124
 (2) network security liability;
125
 (3) replacement or 
restoration of data;
126
 (4) cyber extortion;
127
 and (5) business income 
and expense.
128
 The senior vice president of ISO‘s Insurance Services 
unit stated that the policy was created ―to protect companies from the 
rapidly evolving risk of using the Internet as a business tool.‖129 
When implementing these policies, insurers often require potential 
policyholders to provide an inventory of their computer software, 
past cyber threats, documentation of their employee hiring policies, 
and answers to a multitude of IT-related questions.
130
 Insurers may 
require changes in policies and practices before providing 
coverage.
131
 
 
 120. Id. at 224. 
 121. Id. As of 2005, insurers offering new policies included AIG, Chubb, CIGNA, CAN, 
Liberty Mutual, St. Paul, and Zurich. Cyber-risk policies are also referred to as Network Risk, 
Privacy and Security, or Media Liability insurance policies. Godes, supra note 11. 
 122. Godes, supra note 11. 
 123. Id. See also Press Release, ISO, ISO Introduces Cyber Risk Program To Help Cover 
$7 Trillion E-Commerce Market (Jan. 11, 2005), http://www.iso.com/Press-Releases/2005/ ISO-
INTRODUCES-CYBER-RISK-PROGRAM-TO-HELP-COVER-$7-TRILLION-E-COMMERCE-
MARKET.html. 
 124. Coverage might include claims for copyright, trademark, and service mark 
infringement. Press Release, supra note 123. 
 125. This coverage includes claims for failure to prevent unauthorized access of personal 
information. Id. 
 126. Coverage protects against lost or corrupted data that might result because of a virus or 
other malicious cyber attack. Id. 
 127. Cyber extortion is ―a threat to commit an e-commerce incident, disseminate . . . . 
proprietary information, reveal a weakness in [] source code or publish personal information 
belonging to [] clients.‖ Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Schwartzel, supra note 100. 
 131. See id. 
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Despite their current availability, some observers question 
whether insurers will continue to find cyber insurance policies 
fiscally feasible products to underwrite.
132
 As previously discussed, 
cyber risks involve the actions of criminals actively seeking to attack 
data holders and acquire personal information.
133
 In comparison to 
other liabilities covered by insurance, cyber risk is unique in this 
respect.
134
 A prominent insurance blog aptly describes the relevant 
problem: 
 Here we have a constantly changing source of threats, some 
of them quite sophisticated, and they can be tweaked almost 
instantly to counter potential defenses. Techniques and tools 
can be updated quickly and shared with other black hats. 
Deployment is rapid, widely dispersed, and adaptable. 
 Now, compare this with an industry that has to essentially 
rely on the insured to manage its own defense, relies on an 
annual process of applications that provides only a snapshot of 
the exposure at the time it is completed, and which is 
admittedly challenged at identifying the true risk of loss.
135
 
Additionally, even in the face of the high number of data breaches 
in 2011, the majority of companies in the United States are not 
buying cyber risk insurance.
136
 Various explanations are offered for 
why adoption is slower than expected, including the ―economy, 
uncertainty about how the policies work, lack of awareness about the 
exposure and an assumption . . . . that existing general liability or 
errors and omissions policies will provide coverage.‖137 One survey 
of companies with annual sales from $10 million to $500 million 
 
 132. Cyber Insurance–I Am Growing Increasingly Concerned That Insurers Won‘t Be Able 
to Keep Up With The Threat, THE BETTERLEY REPORT BLOG ON SPECIALTY INSURANCE 
PRODUCTS (Sept. 30, 2011), http://thebetterleyreport.wordpress.com/2011/09/30/cyber- insurance-
i-am-growing-increasingly-concerned-that-insurers-wont-be-able-to-keep-up-with-the-threat/. 
 133. See supra Part II.A.C. 
 134. BETTERLEY REPORT BLOG, supra note 132. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Douglas McLeod, A Surprising Reticence: Computer Network Risk Coverage Is 
Growing, But Not As Fast As One Would Expect Given The Recent Spate Of Corporate Data 
Breaches, RISK & INS. (Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId= 
533342180. 
 137. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
274 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 40:257 
 
 
found only 35 percent of respondents currently had cyber risk 
coverage and 40 percent were not even considering purchasing 
coverage.
138
 Lack of widespread adoption of cyber insurance can be a 
significant problem considering the insurance industry depends on 
spreading risk among a large number of policyholders.
139
 
Some of the slow growth might also be attributed to companies 
believing they are too small to need coverage.
140
 Yet according to a 
study conducted by Verizon in conjunction with the U.S. Secret 
Service, 63 percent of cyber attacks in 2010 were committed against 
businesses with one hundred or fewer employees.
141
 This is troubling 
considering small businesses are more likely to have a difficult time 
affording cyber liability protection.
142
 
Further adding to the unstable ground upon which cyber liability 
insurance stands is the lack of guidance on how courts will interpret 
the policy language.
143
 A declaratory judgment action filed in April 
of 2009 against Federal Insurance Company provided some possible 
insight into the future of cyber risk insurance disputes.
144
 However, 
the litigation was settled out of court pursuant to a confidential 
settlement agreement.
145
 
IV. FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
Considering the difficulties companies face protecting consumer 
personal data and insuring against loss or destruction of that data,
146
 it 
is imperative that insurance coverage is considered in future 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. David Navetta, Cyber Insurance: An Efficient Way To Manage Security And Privacy 
Risk In The Cloud?, INFO. LAW GROUP (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.infolawgroup.com/2012/02/ 
articles/cloud-computing-1/cyber-insurance-an-efficient-way-to-manage-security-and-privacy-risk-
in-the-cloud/. 
 140. McLeod, supra note 136. 
 141. VERIZON, supra note 56. See also Steve Brooks, Op-Ed., Cyber Crimes And Data 
Breaches Are Not Just The Problems Of Big Companies, PAC. COAST BUS. TIMES (Jan. 27, 
2012), http://pacbiztimes.com/2012/01/27/oped-cyber-crimes-and-data-breaches-are-not-just-the-
problems-of-big-companies/. 
 142. Brooks, supra note 141. 
 143. Godes, supra note 11. 
 144. Richard K. Traub, Robert M. Leff & Stuart A. Panensky, Cybersecurity Coverage 
Litigation, 2 DATA SEC. & PRIVACY LAW 14:40 (Ronald N. Weikers ed., 2012). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See discussion supra Parts III.A–B. 
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government action involving data breaches. The Sony data breach 
and other data breaches making recent headlines should provide a 
strong warning to both the business community and the government 
of the extent to which many entities remain at risk for lack of 
insurance against losses resulting from cyber risks. Considering the 
slow pace at which companies are retaining cyber risk insurance,
147
 
and in light of what is at stake,
148
 federal and state governments 
should do their utmost to encourage widespread adoption through 
support of the private cyber insurance market. 
Both the size of Sony as a corporate entity and the large expenses 
that have resulted from cyber attacks on its data network make it 
almost unbelievable that Sony failed to maintain any insurance that 
would cover its liability as a result of a data breach. As previously 
discussed, academics have observed and litigants have experienced 
firsthand the failure of CGL policies to cover cyber risk-related 
losses.
149
 Cyber risks present too many unorthodox coverage 
scenarios for businesses to rely on their traditional CGL policies.
150
 
Although many businesses have been slow to realize this coverage 
gap, it is by no means a brand new revelation.
151
 Considering the 
prominence of Sony, it is difficult to imagine Sony management was 
unaware of such a massive uncovered liability. 
That Sony and other large corporate entities are at risk is 
disconcerting. It demonstrates that the current market incentives are 
not enough to convince even the most sophisticated businesses of the 
importance in insuring against cyber risk. However, the evidence that 
the majority of cyber attacks committed in 2010 were against small 
businesses is equally if not more troubling.
152
 Consider what would 
happen to a small retail business that stores business information and 
client personal information such as credit card numbers on a 
computer. If the retail business was subsequently the target of a cyber 
attack, it could be liable to customers and would most likely need to 
expend a considerable amount of time and money responding to a 
 
 147. See discussion supra notes 132–42. 
 148. See discussion supra notes 23–30, 50–52. 
 149. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See discussion supra Parts III.A–B. 
 152. See discussion supra notes 140–42. 
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possible theft of its business identity. Arguably, large corporations 
like Sony can weather a few of these data breaches without insurance. 
Yet a small retail business could be crippled if not destroyed by just 
one attack. 
There are a number of possible benefits in the state and federal 
facilitation of widespread cyber risk insurance adoption. First, 
insurers providing policies will most likely require better data 
security before providing businesses or organizations coverage.
153
 
This limits the amount of regulation and policing of private data 
security practices required at the national and state level. 
As the proposed federal bills demonstrate, the current proposed 
framework for addressing data breaches and the electronic exposure 
of personal information would involve heavy agency regulation.
154
 
Agency regulation is one way to increase industry cyber security 
standards. However, regulations setting standards and policies will at 
best represent minimum requirements. The private insurance industry 
could instead foster best practices, as insurers require policyholders 
to minimize the risk they are insuring against.
155
 Furthermore, 
considering the ever-changing landscape of cyber risks, it is probable 
that private entities are more capable of changing industry-wide 
standards and procedures to match new risks. 
Aiding increased implementation of cyber risk insurance might 
also decrease the probability that government assistance will be 
needed if a major cyber security incident were to plague large 
institutions or affect widespread private entities. The more the private 
sector is able to internalize isolated as well as systematic data 
security failures, the less government interference is required. 
Government has a few tools at its disposal to help facilitate 
widespread adoption of cyber risk insurance policies. First, the 
federal government could help insurers and policy seekers acquire 
cyber-security information. With increased information sharing, some 
of the uncertainties that are inherent in such a volatile risk area might 
 
 153. See discussion supra notes 130–31. 
 154. See discussion supra notes 88–100. 
 155. At least one observer has observed the prominent role private insurance can play over 
government regulation in strengthening cyber security. Schwartzel, supra note 100 (quoting 
senior counsel at the Center for Democracy and Technology in Washington, D.C.). 
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be eased. Greater ease in acquiring information would arguably 
decrease costs for insurers, which could be passed on to companies 
seeking protection and make insurance more accessible. 
Second, federal and state governments could require government 
contractors and sub-contractors to maintain cyber risk insurance. 
Along with directly increasing the number of businesses with cyber 
risk insurance, this might indirectly influence more businesses in the 
private industry to follow their competitors‘ lead. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The federal government can play a valuable role in furthering 
cyber risk insurance adoption among businesses and organizations in 
the United States. Not only can the government help private entities 
protect themselves against mounting cyber risk, but encouraging the 
expansion of the cyber risk market will also help further the larger 
goal of increasing the effectiveness of cyber security policies and 
practices. Possible tools to achieve this goal include requiring 
government contractors and sub-contractors to have cyber risk 
insurance policies, as well as facilitating greater knowledge of cyber 
risks to ease the financial burden on the insurance industry. 
Whether or not the federal government considers cyber insurance 
to be an important part of cyber security reform, it is clear that 
businesses and organizations must protect themselves from losses 
related to cyber risk. The 2011 Sony data breach is just one example 
of the devastating impact cyber attacks can have on businesses. 
Without adequate cyber risk protection, businesses are at high risk of 
disastrous loss. 
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